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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                        No. CR 14-103-CAS
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              Plaintiff,
                                         PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
                                         RONALD S. CALDERON
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                   v.
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    RONALD S. CALDERON,
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              Defendant.
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         1.
              This constitutes the plea agreement between defendant
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    RONALD S. CALDERON ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's
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    Office for the Central District of California (the "USAO") in the
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    above-captioned case. This agreement is limited to the USAO and
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    cannot bind any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting,
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DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

2. Defendant agrees to:

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a. At the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and provided by the Court, appear and plead quilty to Count Ten of the

indictment in <u>United States v. Ronald S. Calderon and Thomas M.</u>

<u>Calderon</u>, CR No. 14-103-CAS, which charges defendant with Mail Fraud

Through the Deprivation of Honest Services, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1341 and 1346.

- b. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- d. Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- e. Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- f. Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.
- g. Pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and prior to sentencing submits a completed financial statement on a form to be provided by the USAO.

THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

3. The USAO agrees to:

- a. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- b. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.
- c. At the time of sentencing, move to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment as against defendant. Defendant agrees, however, that at the time of sentencing the Court may

consider any dismissed charges in determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the sentence to be imposed.

- d. At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.
- e. Provided that defendant is in Criminal History
 Category I, not seek a sentence of imprisonment above 70 months
 imprisonment, which corresponds to the low end of the Sentencing
 Guidelines range for a Total Offense Level 27 and a Criminal History
 Category I.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

4. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count Ten, that is, Mail Fraud Through the Deprivation of Honest Services, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1346, the following must be true: (1) defendant knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the public of its right to the honest services of the public official through bribery or kickbacks; (2) defendant did so knowingly and with an intent to defraud; (3) the scheme or artifice to defraud involved a material misrepresentation, false statement, false pretense, or concealment of fact; and (5) in advancing, or furthering, or carrying out the scheme to defraud, the defendant used, or caused someone to use, the mails to carry out or to attempt to carry out the scheme.

5. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1346, is: 20 years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.

PENALTIES

- 6. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 7. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.

 Defendant understands that once the court accepts defendant's guilty plea, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that

unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's quilty plea.

8. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony conviction in this case may subject defendant to: removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory; denial of citizenship; and denial of admission to the United States in the future. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony conviction in this case. Defendant understands that unexpected immigration consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

FACTUAL BASIS

9. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offense to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant and the USAO agree to the statement of facts provided below and agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

In 2006, defendant was elected California State Senator for the 30th Senate District and held that office until in or around November 2014. As a public official, defendant owed a duty of honest services to his constituents as well as the citizens of California.

Defendant's brother, defendant THOMAS M. CALDERON, served as a California State Assemblyman for the 58th Assembly District until in or around 2002. Shortly after leaving office, defendant THOMAS M. CALDERON founded the Calderon Group Incorporated ("the Calderon Group") in the Central District of California, a political consulting company, and

also became an Executive Officer of Californians for Diversity ("CFD"), a tax exempt public benefits corporation under Title 26, United States Code, Section 501(1)(c)(4), in or around 2008.

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MICHAEL D. DROBOT ("DROBOT") was one of defendant THOMAS M. CALDERON's political consulting clients. DROBOT owned and operated the Pacific Hospital of Long Beach ("PHLB") and other affiliated companies from in or around 1997 until in or around October 2013. One of the political issues for which defendant THOMAS M. CALDERON was providing consulting services to DROBOT had to do with "spinal pass-through" legislation in California. Specifically, DROBOT wanted to preserve the spinal pass-through legislation in California because it enabled DROBOT and his companies to make substantial amounts of money performing spinal implant surgeries on worker's compensation patients. Defendant knew that DROBOT wanted to preserve the spinal pass-through legislation in California.

In or around June 2010, defendant told DROBOT that his son would be attending college and asked DROBOT to hire his son as a summer employee of PHLB while his son was in college. Defendant told DROBOT that his son would need to earn \$10,000 per summer in order to pay his college tuition each year. DROBOT agreed to hire defendant's son as a summer file clerk at one of his companies and to pay him \$10,000 (take-home or net) per summer while defendant's son was in college. Defendant accepted DROBOT's offer to hire his son and to pay him \$10,000 per summer knowing that as a result of those payments DROBOT expected defendant to perform official acts that benefitted DROBOT, like voting against legislation that would eliminate the spinalthrough and supporting legislation that preserved it, and intending to perform those official acts in return, which defendant did. For example, defendant asked a fellow Senator to introduce SB 896, legislation favorable to DROBOT and the spinal pass-through, and voted against SB 863, legislation unfavorable to DROBOT and the spinal pass-through. DROBOT employed defendant's son for the first three summers he was in college (2010, 2011, and 2012) and paid his son a total of approximately \$30,000.

On or about February 24, 2012, defendant was introduced to UC-1, an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). UC-1 told defendant that he was the owner of an independent film studio in Los Angeles and that he and another undercover agent for the FBI, UC-3, wanted the threshold amount that independent filmmakers had to spend on a film's budget in order to qualify for California's "film tax credit" lowered from \$1 million to \$750,000. UC-1 also told defendant that he wanted his purported girlfriend, UC-2, to be hired to defendant's Senate staff. Defendant agreed to perform official acts that would help UC-1 and UC-3 lower the film tax credit and get UC-2 hired as a Senate staffer, all in exchange for UC-1 and UC-3 agreeing to provide money and other financial benefits to defendant.

For example, on or about July 17, 2012, defendant had UC-1 sign a "Studio Services Agreement" in which UC-1 agreed to pay defendant's daughter \$3,000 per month for services she did not provide to UC-1. Defendant also accepted trips to Las Vegas from UC-1 worth approximately \$12,000. In exchange, defendant performed several official acts in support of lowering the film tax credit to \$750,000, including (1) writing a letter on his official Senate letterhead indicating that he would propose legislation lowering the threshold, (2) introducing a "spot bill" he told UC-1 would be used to propose such legislation, and (3) promising UC-1 he would vote in favor of that proposed legislation.

In addition, defendant had UC-1 make a \$5,000 payment towards his son's college tuition and \$25,000 payment to Californians for Diversity ("CFD"), an entity defendant and his brother, defendant THOMAS M. CALDERON, used to pay themselves. In exchange, defendant performed official acts to get UC-1's purported girlfriend, UC-2, hired to a Senate staff position, including asking the Senate Pro Tem at the time to authorize defendant to hire another staffer and writing a letter on his official Senate letterhead, which defendant submitted to the Secretary of the Senate, falsely claiming that hiring UC-2 was an integral step in addressing the designated area reassignments in his district due to realignment. The Senate approved defendant's request to hire UC-2 as a Senate staffer in defendant's district office and to pay her an annual income of \$45,105 (3,758/mo).

Defendant caused approximately five of the \$3,000 payments UC-1 made to defendant's daughter, as well as the \$25,000 payment to CFD, to be sent via mail by United States Postal Service. Moreover, defendant knowingly concealed his bribery scheme from the public by submitting a false Statement of Economic Interest, California Form 700, to the California Fair Political Practices Commission, which failed to disclose the money and other financial benefits defendant he had received from DROBOT, UC-1, and UC-3. Defendant also did this by falsely claiming that hiring UC-2 was an integral step in addressing the designated area reassignments in his district due to realignment.

NO AGREEMENT REGARDING SENTENCING FACTORS

16. Except as set forth in paragraphs 3(d) and 3 (e) above, defendant and the USAO have no agreement as to the appropriate sentence or the applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors. Except as set forth in paragraphs 3(d) and 3 (e) above, both parties reserve the right to seek any sentence within the statutory maximum, and to argue for any criminal history score and category, base offense

level, specific offense characteristics, adjustments, departures, and variances.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 10. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
 - a. The right to persist in a plea of not quilty.
 - b. The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c. The right to be represented by counsel -- and if necessary have the court appoint counsel -- at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be represented by counsel -- and if necessary have the court appoint counsel -- at every other stage of the proceeding.
- d. The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- e. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f. The right to testify and to present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify.
- g. The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.
- h. Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

11. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty pleas were involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to appeal defendant's convictions on the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty.

LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE

- 12. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a total term of imprisonment on all counts of conviction of no more than 70 months defendant gives up the right to appeal all of the following:

 (a) the procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion of the sentence; (b) the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court; (c) the fine imposed by the court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; (e) the term of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; and (f) any of the following conditions of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court: the conditions set forth in General Orders 318, 01-05, and/or 05-02 of this Court; the drug testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a) (5) and 3583(d).
- 13. The USAO agrees that, provided (a) all portions of the sentence are at or below the statutory maximum specified above, the USAO gives up its right to appeal any portion of the sentence.

RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

14. Defendant agrees that if, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty pleas on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was involuntary, then (a) the USAO will be relieved of all of its

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obligations under this agreement; and (b) should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations will be tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and (ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

RESULT OF VACATUR, REVERSAL OR SET-ASIDE

15. Defendant agrees that if the count of conviction is vacated, reversed, or set aside, both the USAO and defendant will be released from all their obligations under this agreement.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

16. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

17. Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. All of defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the USAO in writing.

If the USAO declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty plea, and (b) the USAO will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement.

- 18. Following the Court's finding of a knowing breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- a. Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action.
- b. Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.
- defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the agreed to factual basis statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from such statements, shall be admissible against defendant in any such action against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any evidence derived from the statements should be suppressed or are inadmissible.

COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

- 19. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors.
- 20. Defendant understands that both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court and (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of sentence. While this paragraph permits both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, this paragraph does not affect defendant's and the USAO's obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.
- 21. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty plea, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. Defendant understands that no one -- not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, 22. there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

- The parties agree that this agreement will be considered part of the record of defendant's quilty plea hearing as if the entire agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.
- 11 AGREED AND ACCEPTED
- 12 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF 13 CALIFORNIA
- 14 EILEEN M. DECKER United States Attorney

M DOUGLAS M/MILIER

JENKINS 17 MACK E.

Assistant/United States Attorneys

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19 RONALD S. Défendant

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21 MARK J. GEKAGOS

Attorney for Defendant Ronald S. Calderon

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I have read this agreement in its entirety. I have had enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms.

I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading guilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason

RØNALAS CALDERON

Defendant

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

06/11/16

I am Ronald S. Calderon's attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this

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agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement. MARK J. GERAGOS Attorney for Defendant Ronald S. Calderon